("Oops! Had the silly thing in reverse")---Optical injection attacks in
  through LED status indicators by Loughry, Joe
(“Oops! Had the silly thing in reverse”)—Optical
injection attacks in through LED status indicators
Joe Loughry, Senior Member, IEEE
University of Denver
Colorado, USA
Email: joe.loughry@cs.du.edu, or joe@netoir.com
Abstract—It is possible to attack a computer remotely through
the front panel LEDs. Following on previous results that showed
information leakage at optical wavelengths, now it seems practic-
able to inject information into a system as well. It is shown to be
definitely feasible under realistic conditions (by infosec standards)
of target system compromise; experimental results suggest it
further may be possible, through a slightly different mechanism,
even under high security conditions that put extremely difficult
constraints on the attacker. The problem is of recent origin;
it could not have occurred before a confluence of unrelated
technological developments made it possible. Arduino-type mi-
crocontrollers are involved; this is an Internet of Things (IoT)
vulnerability. Unlike some previous findings, the vulnerability
here is moderate—at present—because it takes the infosec form
of a classical covert channel. However, the architecture of several
popular families of microcontrollers suggests that a Rowhammer-
like directed energy optical attack that requires no malware
might be possible. Phase I experiments yielded surprising and
encouraging results; a covert channel is definitely practicable
without exotic hardware, bandwidth approaching a Mbit/s, and
the majority of discrete LEDs tested were found to be reversible
on GPIO pins. Phase II experiments, not yet funded, will try to
open the door remotely.
I. THE NATURE OF THE VULNERABILITY
Light emitting diodes (LEDs) are reversible; when illu-
minated by an outside source, they act like tiny solar cells
and produce an electric current. They can be used as pho-
todiode light sensors. The fact has been known since at
least the nineteen-seventies and is occasionally useful [1]–[6].
Modern microcontrollers—those small microprocessors used
for all kinds of things that aren’t generally thought of as
‘computers’—are highly integrated systems-on-a-chip (SoC)
that directly incorporate most of the peripheral devices—
such as memory, network interfaces, and digital-to-analogue
converters—that used to be separate chips interfaced directly
with the address and data buses of the central processing unit
(CPU). Consequently, new microcontrollers tend to expose
instead a large number of general purpose input/output (GPIO)
pins to the outside world for the purpose of reading buttons
and switches, turning on LEDs, controlling small motors, or
connecting to a speaker. GPIO pins are highly adaptable; any
Phase 0 results of this research were orally presented at EMC Europe 2018,
in Amsterdam, the Netherlands (International Symposium and Exhibition on
Electromagnetic Compatibility), 27–30 August 2018.
GPIO can be a digital input or output, and some of them
can be analogue inputs or outputs. They can be pulse width
modulation (PWM) sources, or serial channel clock and data
signals. The behaviour of any given GPIO pin at any particular
time is controlled by software running on the CPU [7].
One other thing about GPIO pins: these days they have
programmable pull-up or pull-down resistors—a great con-
venience to hardware designers.1 In the old days, it was
necessary to install components on the board, taking space
and driving up costs. Now the designer can do all it in
software. (And software can be changed.) Hardware designers
Figure 1. A collection of light emitting diodes. Not only do some LEDs leak
information, but information can leak in through them. Of the ten devices
shown here, only three (the green diffuse, the red diffuse, and the smallest
one—fourth LED from the right) failed to exhibit any exploitable response.
have lots of GPIO pins to use, and use them for all sorts of
things, including LEDs. The third and final piece of the puzzle
(see Table I) was the introduction of ultra high-brightness
LEDs [8]. These are highly efficient, so obviate the need
for external current-buffering transistors. They also—although
the phenomenon has not really been studied by anyone—
seemingly have at least as high a responsivity to external
light sources as older discrete LEDs did (see Figure 1). The
combination is deadly. Reprogrammable GPIO pins connected
to LEDs are an unlocked door through which hackers can send
information in both directions.
This is a preliminary report of work in progress. It has
been recently reduced to practice and yielded some interesting
results. Some practicable attacks have been developed.
1Pull-up resistors—and in some cases pull-down resistors—are needed for
reading switches or buttons reliably in the real world, and sometimes when
resources on the circuit board are shared.000-0-0000-0000-0/00/$00.00 ©2019 IEEE
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Table I
A CONFLUENCE OF SEVERAL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS MADE
THE POSSIBILITY OF REVERSING LEDS INTO A VULNERABILITY NOW.
II. OPTICAL TEMPEST
It has long been known that little blinky lights leak inform-
ation [9]. Depending on the nature of the leakage, information
leakage through optical emanations may or may not be a covert
channel [10]. By the classical definition, a covert channel
comprises a pair of communicating processes on the CPU, but
in many cases, the source of compromising optical emanations
is an accidental function of the hardware, not a design function
of some software running unbeknownst to the data owner.
Most published research related to compromising op-
tical emanations—‘optical TEMPEST’ radiation—concerns
information flow out of the computer system; only a few
papers in the literature have anything to say about information
flow inwards [11]–[13].
Figure 2. Conventional (reverse biased) photodiode in photoconductive mode
of operation.
III. REVERSING LEDS
Inadvertent photosensitivity of electronics is a well-known
phenomenon. In 1952, the installation of the first production
IBM 701 mainframe computer was disrupted when the bright
flashbulbs of news photographers, invited for the occasion,
erased the Williams tube memory of the computer [14]. Don-
ald E. Rosenheim, one of the IBM engineers, said afterwards:
Suffice it to say that shortly thereafter the doors to
the CRT storage frame were made opaque to the
offending wavelengths [15].
Usually, the problem is mitigated by opaque chip packages;
in one application note for a Wafer-Level Chip-Scale Package
(WLCSP), a backside laminate (BSL) is an optional feature
that can protect flip-chip components from being affected
by light [16]. In the case of eraseable programmable read-
only memory (EPROM) chips, the photoelectric effect is
used to advantage by providing a quartz window transparent
to ultraviolet (UV) radiation for erasing the memory. (The
window is covered by a sticker when memory contents are
wanted.) Early memory devices, with the top prised off to
expose the silicon chip to light via a lens, could be re-purposed
as digital cameras [17]–[19]. The problem has occurred in
production as recently as 2015 when a power regulator on the
Raspberry Pi 2 single-board computer (SBC) was found to be
susceptible to camera flashes and laser pointers [20].
Since first being reported by Mims (1973), the phenomenon
of LED responsivity to external radiation has been used a few
times for legitimate purposes. But until recently it was not an
exploitable vulnerability, in general because the attacker would
need to move wires around inside equipment in order to have
an LED—with the polarity right way round—connected to
an input. That changed with the advent of GPIO pins and
programmable pull-up/pull-down resistors. Now an attacker
with the capability only to alter software running on the device
could simply re-assign any pin the designer meant for an
output to be an input; further, depending on circumstances,
the attacker might even be able to compensate for polarity
mismatch.
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Reasonable and unreasonable—but sometimes convenient—ways
of driving LED indicators on modern microcontrollers.
A. GPIO Pins
It is worth looking at how LEDs are hooked up to see
why this is important. In the old days, discrete LEDs were
relatively power-hungry devices and the recommended way to
drive one reliably from a digital signal was as shown in Figure
3a. The buffer/driver might be an inverter, as shown here, or a
transistor; the current-limiting resistor was to protect the LED.
Nowadays, GPIO pins have current-sink specifications within
the range of common LEDs, the supply voltage has gone down
from 5 V to 3.3 V, and so the resistor is often unnecessary. In
fact, in tight board layouts and some designs, when power
traces are a scarce resource and GPIOs are plentiful, the
designer might choose to drive an LED as in Figure 3b.
Here, one GPIO is configured as a digital output and driven
HIGH; the other GPIO is configured as a digital output and
driven LOW. It even has the advantage, on the breadboard,
that it doesn’t matter which way round the LED is hooked
up. Most discrete LEDs are quite tolerant of polarity reversal
at 3.3 VDC. It’s not exactly recommended, but it works. And
there are lots of hardware designers in the world.2
External hardware pull-up or pull-down resistors, as used
on the Intel 8255 and MOS 6522 chips in the 1980s, are,
of course, inaccessible to an adversary; CMOS variants of
2And some of them are on drugs.
the 8255 had internal pull-up resistors but they were not
programmable. (Automatically configured pull-up or pull-
down resistors, which are present in some devices, may
be considered a special case of external discrete hardware
components.)
Programmable pull-up and pull-down resistors, introduced
in 1996 with the ATmega8 microcontroller [21] are far more
useful to an attacker because they can be set in nonsensical
ways. The ATmega series of microcontrollers have only pull-
ups, but the FreeBSD gpio(3) library contains pull-down
methods as well, for those chips that support them [22], [23].
Figure 4. Programmable pull-up and pull-down resistors can be abused by
setting them in non-sensical ways, like this, to reverse-bias an LED and sense
it—as a photodiode—in the (preferred) photoconductive mode.
LEDs are known to work as photodiodes in both the conven-
tional reverse-biased, or photoconductive—the third quadrant
of the V/I plot—region, as well as in the less commonly used
forward-biased, or photovoltaic—quadrant IV—mode [24].
The usual way a photodiode is hooked up is with a small
reverse bias, for improved speed and sensitivity. As shown in
Figure 2, the 10 kΩ pull-up resistor on the input port serves
also to bias the photodiode with 33 mV; the 100 Ω resistor
protects the diode from a short circuit to ground in bright light.
Compare this circuit to Figure 4, a completely nonsensical—
but legal—configuration of two GPIO ports and an LED,
identical in its physical wiring to the LED indicator driver
in Figure 3b right down to the polarity of the LED. The only
difference in Figure 4 is the direction of the GPIOs; rather
than configured as digital outputs, as the designer intended,
they have been re-configured by an attacker as digital inputs
and the programmable pull-up and pull-down resistors turned
on. The topmost GPIO input is ignored—its only purpose is to
serve as a provider for a pull-down resistor—and the bottom-
most GPIO will see an approximately 3.3 V level from the
ersatz photodiode in darkness, or 0 V in the light. That is
enough, in testing, to sense logic levels from the LED and
provide a channel to the inside.
IV. THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES
What can be done with that vulnerability? After the public-
ation of the 2002 journal article that started it all, I continued
to search for further optical emanations—especially from disk
drive indicators—without success. I remembered the first time
I’d heard about LED photosensitivity and I wondered if it
could be exploited as a way in [2]. But the sticking point
was always how to do it with an unmodified target, as we
had done with optical TEMPEST. The vulnerability back then
was in hardware: LED indicators on numerous equipment
simply leaked information. That was what all the previous
researchers—Wright, van Eck, Smulders, Kocher, Kuhn, and
Kubiak—had found [25]–[31]. All of these attacks exploited
unmodified, un-subverted—although inadequately shielded—
systems. In contrast, attacks like GUNMAN or Soft TEM-
PEST or VAGRANT require the attacker to be able to install
some kind of malicious hardware or software on the system
in order to cause the compromising emanations to occur [32]–
[34].
A. Covert Channels
In the appendix of that 2002 paper, though, we described
another form of attack—an active attack—which required the
attacker to implant malicious code (malware) on the target
system. This was a classical covert channel (vide supra) in
that it required two intentionally communicating processes—
one inside the computer system and another outside. (This
is the difference between an accidental information leak and
a covert channel.) It was less interesting, we thought, than
the intrinsic vulnerability of an accidental information leak,
although much easier to exploit, on the other hand, assuming
the attacker had the capability to emplace malicious hardware
on the target system.
Now we have the Internet of Things (IoT) and in this world,
malware is much easier to introduce than before (because
there are orders of magnitude more devices in the world,
hence manufacturers design in the capability to update their
software remotely [because otherwise it would be impossible
to visit them all] but hackers find out how to exploit those
remote update features, and use them to install malware on the
devices). Consequently, many information security researchers
since have employed malware on the target system to generate
intelligible compromising optical emanations, greatly simpli-
fying the problem of receiving information (since the trans-
mitted information can be encoded sensibly, modulated onto
a high-powered carrier, and sent under relatively controlled
conditions). The most prolific research group in the field of
malware-facilitated compromising electromagnetic emanations
is Guri et al. [35]–[47].3 Interestingly, acoustical comprom-
ising emanations researchers have tended to stick to the more
difficult problem of intrinsic vulnerabilities [49]–[54] although
Guri is active there with his methodology as well [55]–[58].
Countermeasures to covert channels classically lie along
a pair of conceptual axes: prevention and detection. Covert
channel analysis (CCA) is notoriously time consuming and
difficult, focusing on identification, characterisation, and lim-
itation of timing and storage remanences. CCA strives to
block potential covert channels by clearing shared areas of
storage before they can be reused, or by limiting the potential
bandwidth of covert timing channels by adequately synchron-
ising access to shared resources. Neither of these mitigations
can be effective in the face of post hoc malware installed
for the purpose of receiving from a covert channel. Instead,
prevention, detection, and removal of malware (by means
3Guri finally made the disk drive indicator attack (§IV) work in 2017 but
he used a malware to do it [48].
Table II
RESULTS OF DISCRETE LED REVERSING EXPERIMENTS. THE RESPONSE SEEN ON BOTH ANODE and CATHODE FOR SOME LEDS IS SURPRISING. THE
RESPONSE SEEN AT THE CATHODE—ONLY—OF THE DIFFUSE YELLOW LED IS EVEN MORE SURPRISING; THE INITIAL HYPOTHESIS TO EXPLAIN
APPARENT CATHODE EMISSION (THAT PHOTOCURRENTS ORIGINATING AT THE ANODE MIGHT BE FLOWING THROUGH THE DIODE TO THE CATHODE) WAS
INVALIDATED BY THE SUBSEQUENT OBSERVATION THAT ONE LED ACTUALLY PRODUCED A PHOTOCURRENT FROM THE CATHODE TERMINAL ONLY.
Excitation Wavelength
405nm violet laser diode 532nm green laser diode 640nm red laser diode white LED [not a laser]
Target Device (anode) (cathode) (anode) (cathode) (anode) (cathode) (anode) (cathode)
5mm true green LED G# H# G# H# G# H# G# H#
5mm pink LED G#
5mm white LED G#
3mm deep red LED§
5mm yellow diffuse LED B B B B
5mm blue LED G# H# G# H# G# H# G# H#
5mm red diffuse LED§
5mm UV LED G# G# G# G#
5mm green diffuse LED§
5mm ultrabright red LED G# H# G# H# G# H# G# H#
Legend:
G# Expected responseH# Unexpected response
B Unexplainable response
§ No response from these devices
of continual system integrity checking, cryptographic signing
of software updates, and protected storage, for example) are
needed.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
I found this vulnerability because I went looking for it.
There was no point to searching for vulnerabilities in a hard-
ware configuration that does not exist. That is, until Arduino
came along (refer to the timeline in Table I). At first, the
logical approach seemed to be to look at the conventional ways
that LEDs are hooked up to GPIO pins (Figure 3a), and the
conventional way that photodiodes are sensed (Figure 2), and
attempt to reconcile the two in such a way that available GPIOs
might be reconfigured to put an LED into reverse bias (Figure
4). But that never worked. It turns out that LEDs function best
as photodiode sensors in photovoltaic mode.
The results were startling (see Table II). First of all, what
was thought to be the most promising approach—reverse-
biasing the LED to sense it like a conventional photodiode
in photoconductive mode—did not work at all. Secondly, 70
percent of the first batch of ten LEDs chosen at random
from the junk box (Figure 1) exhibited strong photovoltaic
effects. Thirdly, photocurrent was commonly observed on
both anode and cathode leads. Finally, my hypothesis (that
photocurrents originating at the anode were flowing through
the diode where they were also sensed at the cathode) was shot
down by the observation that one LED produced photocurrent
on the cathode terminal only. (Until the yellow diffuse LED is
decapsulated and examined more closely, it remains possible
that the anode and cathode terminals of this one device were
misidentified.) No straightforward relationship amongst the
emission wavelength of an LED, the colour of the package
(optical filter), and the excitation wavelength to optical re-
sponsivity is apparent.
LEDs have a relatively wide emission spectrum—at least
compared to lasers—and respond to excitation wavelengths
over an even wider spectral range. Obviously, if the LED
package incorporates an optical filter (such as the familiar
5 mm red diffuse LED in a red epoxy package) then the filter
will limit excitation by wavelengths outside the transmission
band of the filter.
VI. THE NEXT EXPERIMENTS
If a directed energy optical attack is to be possible without
a previous system compromise, then it will be necessary to
alter the CPU’s internal state. Already demonstrated is the
capability to photovoltaically charge GPIO lines above or
below logic thresholds. What remains—in order to reject the
null hypothesis—is to show that physical effects might be
propagated into the interior.
A. Threat Model, Countermeasures, and Limitations
Ultimately, the goal is execution of arbitrary code. To get
there, in stages, we plan to attack the instruction fetch and de-
coding process first. Granted that only one or a few bits of the
instruction word, in the most optimistic scenario, might turn
out to be manipulable, the experimental design aims to find,
by exhaustive search, any window of opportunity that exists
to set or clear as much as a single bit in any instruction at any
phase of the system clock—including thoughtful exploration
of the limits of allowable timing exceptions.
Countermeasures (in hardware) are expected to include one-
way buffering, tight control of tolerances in setup-and-hold
timing, cryptographically signed instructions, as well as a CPU
option to redirect immediately to a safe state upon decoding
any invalid instruction, up to a Hamming distance of 1, within
the current security context.4
From the ATmega328P data sheet, it is clear that GPIO
ports (buffered, probably, by latches) are on the internal data
bus [22]. The AVR core is a Harvard architecture, so we have
no hope of directly modifying instruction decoding from the
data bus, but the programme counter is on the data bus, and the
stack resides in data SRAM which is also on the data bus. The
question is, can we impress a value on the data bus, through
one of the I/O modules, from a GPIO pin? That is what current
experiments are trying to do. If doable asynchronously, then
an attacker could mess with ALU results, status and control
registers, or memory fetches. From experience, any effect at all
is likely stochastic [59]. The most an attacker might be able to
do is to probabilistically flip one or more bits in the instruction
stream between decoding and execution; maybe the attacker
could convert a valid instruction into a slightly different one,
or corrupt an instruction to an invalid opcode that would be
ignored (Figure 6 shows the window of opportunity).
Lacking specific internal implementation details—short of
reverse engineering the microcontroller from transistor doping
regions and wires [60] in a microscopic die photo—we must
experiment. To do it, we need a fast, controllable optical
modulator. Unfortunately, Pockels cells tend to top out at about
5 kHz, so we are forced to use an electro-optic (EO) modulator,
which can be driven at more like 250 MHz.
Figure 5. Phase II experimental setup (proposed).
B. Experimental Design for Phase II
Figure 5 shows the proposed experimental setup; a visible
continuous wave (CW) laser source—chosen for intensity and
directivity5—amplitude modulated by a lithium niobate crystal
between two crossed polarisers and aimed at the LED under
test, which is connected to two GPIO pins on the single
board computer (SBC) as in the previous assumptions about
target hardware. The duty cycle of the laser illumination
pulse is determined by a function generator triggered by the
SBC—via any other conveniently unused GPIO pin—through
4This might be of interest in other high security or high reliability realms
such as cryptographic hardware or radiation resistant processors.
5Also useful later on for the remote attack.
T1 T2 T3
INSTRUCTION ONE
FETCH
DECODE
WRITE
INSTRUCTION TWO
FETCH
DECODE
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CLK
TRIGGER
DELAY GEN. RANGE
Figure 6. Notional timing diagram of a representative CPU. Only trivial
pipelining is shown because it is irrelevant; the vulnerability, if it exists, must
affect all execution units.
a programmable delay generator. In essence, it’s a lock-in
amplifier synchronised to a control signal emitted by the
SBC; we use the delay generator to hunt around before and
after the synchronisation pulse, looking for any vulnerable
microsecond. Whilst the SBC is exercised by cycle-counted
assembly language code presenting each opcode in turn ex-
actly once in a defined time window, the delay generator will
be swept across the width of the microarchitecture’s timing
diagram, a coroutine watching concurrently for unexpected
results in any of the CPU registers (Figure 6). Conceptually,
the method is a hybrid of glitching [61] and fuzzing [62],
except induced through I/O pins instead of via the power
supply.
C. Validation Plan
The expected limitations are severe: likely it may be pos-
sible only to force a fixed value onto the internal data bus—for
example, to force bits low but not high—although even that
much is enough to alter a running stream of instructions; e.g.,
to convert a branch instruction to some other kind, thereby
bypassing a security check in code.
The success criteria for this experiment are dependent on the
detector (Figure 7) and the injector (Figure 5). To improve the
chance of success, some independent variables are eliminated.
Firstly, we need only analyse one execution unit; the location
of the trigger within the fetch-execute cycle can be arbitrary,
because we have a delay generator. Secondly—at first—use the
alternative validation path shown as a dashed line in Figure 5.
By applying logic levels directly to the target pin, questions of
optical intensity, aim, focus, wavelength, and LED responsivity
are moot. Once the vulnerable time window has been found,
then directed energy is brought back into the equation. In
the worst case, this method would validate the absence of
race conditions or setup/hold violations in the CPU support
circuitry.
This kind of noisy, high-dimensional data analysis is ex-
actly the kind of scientific application for which machine
learning (ML) is highly applicable [49], [50], [63]. How-
ever, there are risks [64], [65]. To mitigate the scientific
hazard (primarily lack of replication) of over-enthusiastic
application of ML, we propose to use different methods,
beginning with SciKit-Learn 〈https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
modules/outlier detection.html〉 for novelty and outlier detec-
tion [66]. The training phase presents a difficulty; in contrast
to typical use of ML, we don’t a priori know what stimulus
will result in anomalous behaviour—we have to try all stim-
uli. Turning the problem upside-down, therefore, we propose
to train the neural network (NN) on normal behaviour—
instrumented by periodic snapshotting of all registers including
stack and ALU result—and then use the trained NN to detect
anomalous behaviour. For the second method, TensorFlow:
use a support vector machine (SVM) unsupervised to learn a
soft boundary from the normal training data [67]. Funding to
Figure 7. Coroutines on the CPU ensure a stable trigger and reliable detection
of anomalous behaviour of anything on the internal data bus.
purchase the necessary apparatus to begin Phase II experiments
is in the proposal stage. Finally, in Phase III, plan to attack
the in-built LED of a standard SBC, to prove that it can be
done in practice on hardware in the real world.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Possible right now is for malware to freely repurpose LED
status indicators into optical receivers capable of ingesting
information at least in the high kbit s−1 range. This has
been demonstrated in the lab. The chance that an attacker
will find an agreeable LED available for use seems to be
70 percent, although that number depends on the hardware
designer making a specific kind of mistake.
These experiments are the tip of the iceberg regard-
ing methods for sensing—GPIO digital bipolar, GPIO di-
gital single-ended, cathode emission, analogue GPIO (single
or double-ended)—and improvements to energy transfer for
Rowhammer-style attacks are all waiting to be explored.
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